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A new point of law concerning telegraph companies has been
decided in the case of Will et al. v. Postal Tel. Cable CO., 37 N.
Y. Sup. 933, where it is held that the regulation of a telegraph
company that its messenger boy, sent to receive a telegram for
transmission, shall be deemed the agent of the sender, is invalid.
The Court also considers it necessary "to place some wholesome
limitations upon the rule under which corporations are attempt-
ing, by shrewd and ingenious devices, to escape all responsibility
for their negligent acts." While they grant that telegraph com-
panies have power to make certain regulations for the proper
conduct of their business, they declare that this one is unreason-
able and contrary to good, sound public policy, and consider that
if such a regulation is permitted there is no reason why telegraph
companies cannot impose upon their patrons the requirement
that the operator and the messenger at the other end of the line
shall be regarded as the patron's agent, and thus escape entirely
what little liability they now assume.
By a majority of five to four the Supreme Court recently
upheld as constitutional the Act of February xith, 1893, empow-
ering the Federal Courts to enforce the Interstate Commerce Law
by compelling witnesses to testify.
In this case, Brown v. Walker, i6 Sup. Ct. 144, the auditor of
the Alleghany Valley Railroad Company was subpoenaed as a
witness before a federal grand jury to testify with reference to
a charge under investigation by that body, against certain officers
and agents of the company, of having violated certain provisions
of the Interstate Commerce Act. Several interrogatories were
addressed by the grand jury to the witness which he refused to
answer on the ground that his answers might tend to criminate
him. On a rule to show cause why he should not be punished
for a contempt and be compelled to answer, he invoked his
constitutional privilege of silence. He was thereupon adjudged
to be in contempt, and on habeas corpus before the Circuit Court
the same position was taken. From that judgment there was an
appeal to the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the majority
of the court, held that the act in question, by providing that
&,no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing
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concerning which he may testify," is in the nature of a general
amnesty; and that, therefore, since it secures immunity from
prosecution, is not in conflict with that clause of the fifth amend-
ment which declares that no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. The intention of
the constitutional provision is thus merely to secure the witness
from punishment, not to shield him from the disgrace or oppro-
brium attending the publication of his crime, and the fact that
the witness might be compelled to plead his statutory immunity
by way of confession and avoidance, or might be prosecuted in
a state court as a result of information disclosed by his testimony
before a United States court, was held to be a danger of too
remote and unsubstantial a character to have been within the
contemplation of the constitutional provision.
Mr. Justice Shiras, in an opinion with which Mr. Justice
White and Mr. Justice Gray concurred, citing the authority of
Chief-Justice Marshal in Burr's trial, and of Mr. Justice Blatch
ford in Councilman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, maintained that
inasmuch as the statute does not in fact secure complete immu-
nity, but exposes the witness to possibility of prosecution in the
state courts, a possibility which under our complex system of
trade and transportation may naturally be expected to frequently
arise, it is therefore an infringement upon the constitutional
provision and void.
Mr. Justice Field dissented upon the broader ground that the
statute undertakes in certain cases to grant a pardon to offenders,
a power which by the Constitution it is the sole prerogative of
the President to exercise, and that it not only takes away the
privilege of silence guaranteed by the fifth amendment, but also
encroaches upon the fourth amendment by subjecting to "un-
reasonable searches and seizures."
The Interstate Comnfierce Law is a salutary measure designed
to protect the people against oppression and exorbitant discrim-
ination by transportation companies transacting business be-
tween the different States, and in upholding the act of February.
xi, 1893, the court seems to have given great weight to the argu-
ment that the act in question was necessary to enable the courts
to enforce the beneficial provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Law, but it is a matter of regret that the purposes of the law
could not have been accomplished through the courts with the
existing machinery, without extending their powers by resort to
an experimental statute which appears both in letter and in
spirit to infringe upon the security to liberty and reputation
which the constitutional amendment was intended to provide.
